






(Universita’ Statale di Milano and University of Glasgow)
Macroeconomics and Politics Revisited.




This paper provides a model encompassing both partisan influences on monetary
policy and the issue of Central Bank independence. In a regime of partial
independence, Central Bank’s policy responses are not immune from partisan
influences. Still, the latter fail to affect sistematically the expected output level in
election years. The predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical









In the field of macroeconomics, the last twenty years have  witnessed an
unprecedented interest in the interaction between policymakers and private sector and in
the institutions that shape it. The Rational Partisan Theory (Chappell and Keech, 1986
and 1988; Alesina, 1987, 1988 and 1989) assumes that politicians are ideologically
motivated and adopt their most preferred policy during their term in office. Because of
electoral uncertainty, the victory of the more conservative party is accompanied by a
recession while the success of the less conservative one pushes output above its natural
level. To the contrary, Political Business Cycles theorists posit that politicians act to
maximise their chances of being re-elected by attempting to stimulate output just before
elections (Nordhaus, 1975). This prediction is mitigated if expectations are  rational
(Persson and Tabellini, 1990).
Both political and partisan models assume that governments are in full control of
monetary policy. This is in sharp contrast with a large body of literature which has
ranked the degree of independence enjoyed by Central Banks in OECD countries (Grilli,
Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1991; Alesina and Summers, 1993). We believe that standard
partisan (political) models and the related empirical evidence should be reconsidered to
take into account the dampening effect of Central Bank independence on electoral
monetary policy shifts.
This  paper  builds on two strands of macroeconomic theory: monetary policy
under electoral uncertainty and Central Bank independence. Theoretical and empirical
literature has developed around each of these ideas 
1, but no unified treatment of them
has been provided so far. We blend the well-known rational partisan model by Alesina3
(1987) with the model of Central Bank independence by Lohmann (1992) to appraise the
effects of electoral uncertainty. In a regime of partial independence, the incumbent
government can revert the Central Bank’s decisions at a positive and finite cost. This
arrangement lends credibility to Central Bank’s policy, while preserving its
accountability. Since the incumbent policymaker can credibly threaten to take back
control of monetary policy, a policy-motivated Central Banker is prepared to adjust its
monetary stance when requested. Thus, if the policymaker’s benefits from assuming
control of monetary policy fall short of costs, the Central Banker is allowed to follow an
unconstrained policy. But, if the policymaker’s benefits exceed the overriding costs, the
Central Bank partly fulfills the desiderata of the elected government. It is only in this case
that partisan influences are felt. We show that, in a partial independence regime, partisan
influence persists but partisan cycles may fail to materialise. Thus ¾ in contrast with the
predictions of the popular Rogoff (1985) model and the original Lohmann model ¾
greater independence may lower inflation without raising output variability: the limited
scope for post-electoral surprises offsets the distortionary output responses of a
conservative Central Bank. This is consistent with the results presented in Alesina and
Summers (1993) who find that the  degree of Central Bank  independence ¾ albeit
negatively correlated with national inflation rates ¾ is orthogonal to output variability.
Finally, we focus on the conduct of U.S. monetary policy. The partial
independence model is well-suited to describe the behavior of the Fed and allows to
rationalise some empirical evidence on output cycles in the U.S. which is not entirely
consistent with the partisan model (Alesina and Sachs, 1988; Klein, 1996).4
The rest of the paper is laid out  as  follows. In Section 1 we discuss the
implications of the  partisan  model and the  consequences of  commitment to a fully
independent Central Bank. In Section 2 we develop a model of partial Central Bank
independence under partisan policymakers. In Section 3 we discuss the  U.S. case.
Section 4 concludes.
1. Models of Partisan Cycles and Central Bank Independence
Consider an economy described by the following supply function (Fischer, 1977):
yw z tt t t =- - + () p () 1
The log of output yt is a function of real wages ( ) wt t -p  and a shock zt which is
normally distributed with zero mean and finite variance. Nominal wages (wt) are rational
expectations of inflation based on information available at time t -1:
wE tt t = - 1 p () 2
where E is the expectation operator.
In this economy, an election takes place at the beginning of every second period.
Two ideologically motivated parties enter the electoral contest: the Democrats (D) and
the Republicans (R). In the conduct of monetary policy these parties differ only in the
relative weight they attach to inflation vs. output stabilisation around a target  ~ y > 0, as

























RD > , implying that the Republicans are the most inflation-averse party.5
The probability of winning an election for the Democratic (Republican) party is P
(1- P). As in Alesina (1987), we take P as exogenous and assume it to be common
knowledge. Alternative institutional arrangements close the model.
In the case of full discretion, monetary policy is entrusted with the elected party.
We refer to it as the incumbent: iD R =, . When in office the incumbent takes nominal
wages as given and after observing the shock zt sets the policy instrument ¾p t ¾ so as

























constant across election and non-election periods and a term which varies depending on











. Suppose t is an election year. Since














































































 describes the impact of a monetary surprise on




R t D tt
<< , a Democratic (Republican) incumbent
generates a positive (negative) surprise.
Monetary surprises cannot be replicated at t +1. In fact, nominal wages wt+1 are
set when the identity of the incumbent is known. Thus,
w
y




Under full discretion, a partisan cycle emerges. As soon as elected, a Democratic
Administration masters an expansion while a Republican one delivers a recession. Later
in their term in office, both Democrats and Republicans lack incentives to generate
surprises.
There are several ways to test for partisan cycles. Partisan effects may show up in
inflation 
2 and output shifts. Alesina and Roubini (1992) and Alesina, Cohen and Roubini
(1993) find evidence of partisan effects in inflation for a number of countries including
the U.S.. Lockwood, Maloney and Hadri (1995) point out that these estimates do not
pass standard misspecification tests. Moreover,  tests of the Partisan hypothesis rest
upon the unspelled assumption that the incumbent Administration has full control of
monetary policy instruments (Alesina, 1988 and 1989; Alesina and Sachs, 1988; Alesina
and Roubini, 1992; Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995 
3). The findings of the literature on
Central Bank independence question this assumption: it is widely acknowledged that in
some countries, notably the U.S. and Germany, the Central Bank is entrusted with a7
significant  degree of independence in the  conduct of monetary  policy (Grilli,
Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1991; Alesina and Summers, 1993) 
4. Taking this view to the
extreme,  Alesina  and  Gatti (1995)  investigate the consequences of monetary policy
delegation to a fully independent Central Bank. Suppose the Central Bank is entitled to
set the inflation rate so as to minimise its loss function:




t =-+ ~ 2 2 tp     (8)









































this regime lowers the inflationary bias which would otherwise prevail under discretion 
5
EP E P E BD R () () ( ) () pp p <+ - 1 (12)
but need not raise output variability. For tt
R B < in non-electoral years output
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because, although output variance in the face of supply shocks increases, electoral effects
are wiped off 
7.
This result provides an intuitive explanation for  the findings of  Alesina and
Summers  (1993), but the key underlying assumption ¾ full Central Bank independence
¾ is at odds with the empirical evidence on both partisan cycles and Central Bank
independence. In fact, if monetary institutions in OECD countries behaved according to
the Alesina and Gatti model, we should not observe electoral effects at all. Moreover,
although the studies cited above show that some Central Banks are more independent
than others, this does not imply that any Central Bank is entirely immune from political
influences. For instance the Bundesbank’s decisions can be vetoed by the government
(Kennedy, 1991), while the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy is reviewed twice a year
by the Congress Banking Committee (Akhtar and Howe, 1991). The working principle
of these arrangements is that attempts to bend ex-post the Central Bank’s commitment to
a low inflation policy has to be costly. This gives rise to the  notion of  partial
independence introduced by Lohmann (1992) on which we rely to develop our model.10
2. Partial Independence and Policy Convergence
Suppose monetary policy is delegated to a Central Banker whose objective
function is as in (8). As in Lohmann (1992), the incumbent Administration retains the
option to ex-post revoke the Central Banker’s decisions at a strictly positive and finite
cost c. The actual degree of conservatism of a Central Banker is the outcome of a
particular institutional design reflecting a complex bargaining process among several
interest groups. It may well be the case that at any point in time the Central Bank is too
conservative according to some factions and not enough so according to others. For this
reason, albeit we present formal results only for tt
R B <, in the following we also
discuss the implications of tt
R B > 
8  .
The Central Banker sets the inflation rate to minimise its loss function subject to
the following constraint:
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We can identify two regions: an independence region, I, where the Central Banker runs
an unconstrained policy, and an accommodating region, A, where the Central Banker
adopts a monetary stance such that the incumbent Administration is indifferent between
overriding or not his decisions 
10. Lohmann (1992) shows that in equilibrium the Central
Banker is never overridden.
As a simple inspection of (16) and (17) reveals, the degree of independence
enjoyed by the Central Banker depends on the outcome of the electoral contest. Rational
agents anticipate this. Hence, in election periods nominal wages reflect electoral
uncertainty.
If  t  is an election year
wP E P E tt
Bi D
t
Bi R == + - = () ( ) () pt t pt t 1 (18)
As in the case of full discretion, expected and actual monetary policy differ
systematically.  But  under  partial independence neither the  election of a Democratic
(Republican) Administration need imply a positive (negative) monetary surprise.
Consider first the case of a Democratic  Administration. If z I t D Î , the Central
Banker is allowed to run an unconstrained policy. By substituting (16a) into (1), we
obtain:12



































 the Central Banker’s independent policy generates a negative surprise under




 coincides with inflation expectations in a regime of full
independence, it falls short of wt
BRD
   whenever ttt >>. On the other hand, even if the
Central Banker is less inflation-averse than a Republican Administration, the inequality
may still be satisfied. This would be the case when either t
D is relatively low or the
chances of a Democratic victory are judged substantial by the private sector 
11.
It is only for zA tD Î  that monetary policy can be expansionary under a Democratic
incumbent. In fact, for large shocks the benefits from output stabilisation exceed the cost
of overriding the Central Bank and the Administration can credibly threaten to take back
control of monetary policy. The Central Banker’s optimal response is to accommodate.
By substituting (16b) into (1) we obtain:









































































 the accommodating policy limits the direct impact of shocks on



















 an expansionary surprise accompanies the
election of a Democratic Administration for any zA tD Î  
12.
We turn now to the case of a Republican incumbent. If zI tR Î , the Central
Banker retains independence and output amounts to



































, as we argued above, a negative surprise accompanies the  election of a
Republican Administration. When zA tR Î , output amounts to




















































































Finally, in non-election years, electoral uncertainty disappears, but ¾ due to the
working of the partial independence regime ¾ partisan influences are still felt when large
shocks hit the economy. In fact14




i ++ + + == - + 11 1 1 1 () ( ) ( ) pp p (24)
where  {} qz z A it t i =Î Pr .
Last but not least, the partial independence model explains why an increase in the
Central Bank degree of independence lowers inflation but  need not  raise output
variability. The  intuition  behind this result is indeed very simple. Under a partial
independence regime output variance in each period amounts to
[] [] ss s yy
D
y
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where  sy
D 2,  and sy
R 2,  define output variance under a Democratic and a Republican
incumbent, respectively. As the Central Bank degree of independence increases, regions











. Thus, the size of expected post-electoral surprises falls. This implies
that both [][] Ey Ey
DR () ()
22
 and    fall. On the other hand, since the Central Bank is by
assumption more conservative than a Democratic incumbent (t t B D > ), greater
independence raises sy
D 2, . Finally, the effect of an increase in c on sy
R 2,  is ambiguous,
depending on the sign of () tt
BR - : if () tt
BR -< 0, sy
R 2,  falls. For the same reason,
greater Central Bank independence may reduce sy
2 even in non-electoral years, when
Ey i () 2 0 = 
14.15
3. Partisan Cycles and the Independent Status of the Fed
Monetary institutions in the U.S. economy provide a good case study to
investigate the interactions between partisan politics and a partially independent Central
Bank. On one hand, the American political system is “polarised” (Alesina and Rosenthal,
1995). On the other, although the Federal Reserve independent status is widely
recognised, there is ample evidence that the Bank responds to signals from the
Administration (Havrilesky, 1988 and 1994; Grier 1991).
The institutional features of the Federal Reserve support our view that a regime
of partial independence characterises monetary policy in the U.S.. Seven members of the
Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committe (FOMC) are presidential appointees,
but there are good reasons to believe that their policy preferences are at best imperfectly
coincident with those of their political principal (Havrilesky and Gildea, 1992). Last but
not least, theoretical models suggest that the staggered-appointments rule reduces the
scope for introducing a partisan bias in monetary policy 
15, and should provide the
incentive for each party in power to appoint relatively conservative Governors (Waller,
1989). It is also well known that the remaining members of the FOMC, being Chairmen
of the Federal District Banks, de facto represent the interests of the financial community,
bringing  the  Fed  policymaking body closer to the Rogoff-Lohmann model of
conservative Central Banker 
16. Nevertheless the Fed is far from enjoying full
independence. In fact, scholars of the political economy of monetary policy in the U.S.
have presented accounts of the relationship between the Bank and its political principals
which appears to be more complex than one would expect on the grounds of the Fed
statutory obligations. It has been repeatedly pointed out that political pressures become16
more stringent ¾ and more difficult to resist ¾ during adverse cyclical conditions
whereas in “normal” times the Fed is able to run an independent policy. These distinctive
features have long characterised the conduct of monetary policy in the U.S..  Wicker
(1993, p.238) remarks this with reference to the early years of the  Fed.  Havrilesky
(1994, p.125) strengthens this view relatively to the  post  World War II period,
presenting  two  indexes  for  measuring Administration and Congressional influence on the
Fed. His work provides “.....statistical evidence of a direct link between the state of the
economy (as a cause) and political pressures (as a proximate effect) and changes in
monetary policy (as an ultimate effect)... ”. This is strikingly consistent with the working
of a partial independence regime.
Empirical  tests of the partisan hypothesis reflect the mix between partisan
influences  and partial Central Bank independence which, in our view, characterises the
conduct of U.S. monetary policy. Alesina and Sachs (1988) test the implications of the
partisan model for the U.S., focusing on output 
17. The data do not reject the prediction
that the election of a Republican Administration coincides with negative surprises, but
the election of a Democrat is not significantly related to output expansions 
18. Klein
(1996) applies duration analysis to detect the temporal links between elections and the
turning points of the U.S. business cycle. Similarly to Alesina and Sachs (1988), he finds
“..a difference by the party of the victorious presidential candidate” (Klein, 1996,
p.100). In fact, following a Republican victory it is less (more) likely that an expansion
begins (comes to an end). To the contrary, the prediction that Democratic incumbents
sistematically expand output finds less support (Klein, 1996, p.97). This asymmetry is
difficult to rationalise within the framework of the standard partisan model. By contrast,17
our  model is consistent with the asymmetric effect of Republican and Democratic
incumbents on output.
Let us assume that the economy is characterised by some values of
Pc y






































Monetary surprises are always  negative  under a Republican incumbent, apparently
confirming  the standard partisan model. However this is due to partisan influences only
when  zA tR Î . By contrast, the election of a Democratic government will trigger a
positive surprise only if zA tD Î . This may explain why evidence on  the influence of
Democratic incumbents is inconclusive, since small shocks trigger a negative surprise
even under a Democratic incumbent. Hence, the partial independence model outperforms
the standard partisan model as well as the full independence model, supporting the view
that partisan influence matters only when large shocks hit the economy.18
4. Conclusions
This paper calls for a reassessment of the relationship between monetary policy
and politics, taking into account the role of Central Banks. Standard partisan models
assume full government discretion in the conduct of monetary policy. Tests of the
partisan hypothesis for the U.S. are often based on the assumption that “...no distinction
is made between the ²Administration² and the Central Bank. The implicit assumption is
that the Administration has some direct or indirect control over monetary policy.”
(Alesina and Sachs, 1988, p.67).
In our work, we show that when explicit attention is paid to the costs of
pressurizing the Central Bank in an economy where constitutional provisions are made to
preserve its independence, the predicted partisan cycles may fail to materialize. We find
that the partial independence model provides a more satisfactory explanation of the
available empirical evidence on the U.S. business cycle than the standard partisan model
does. As it suggests that in the U.S. economy partisan influences are felt only when large
shocks hit the economy, it allows to rationalise the different degree of significance of
explanatory variables related to Republican vs. Democratic incumbents, emerging from
the empirical literature. Thus, our analysis bears implications for the debate about the
over-politicization of the Fed. If the accountability of a conservative Central Bank to an
elected body is deemed desirable -¾ as in Lohmann (1992) -¾ our work shows that it
comes at the cost of exposing the economy to some electoral uncertainty.19
Appendix I
To establish that delegating monetary policy to a conservative Central Banker lowers the









































<  . It follows that delegating monetary policy to a fully independent Central
Banker lowers the inflationary bias.
Appendix II
We proceed in steps to prove that (16a) and (16b) are the solution to:
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Step 1: Call p t** the solution to:20


















Step 2: Call  pt
* the value of the inflation rate that leaves the incumbent policymaker
indifferent between overriding or not the Central Banker: